The categories of the revolution in classical German philosophy In D. Losurdo, Hypochondria dell'impolitico. Hegel's critique of past and present , Milella, Lecce 2001, pp. 9-33. Ed orig. in D. Losurdo (ed.), French Revolution and German classical philosophy , Urbino, Quattroventi (Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies), 1993, pp. 343-358; version fr. in A. Tosel (ed.), Philosophies de la Révolution française. Représenations et Interpretations, Paris, Vrin, 1984; version ted. in M. Buhr (eds.), Französische Revolution und klassische deutsche Philosophie , Berlin, Akademie, 1990, pp. 96-114;
1. Revolutionary upheavals and natural disasters
We plan to examine more specifically the positions taken by political, conceptual categories with which the German classical philosophy, and more generally the German culture of the time, is trying to frame and understand theoretically the great upheavals occurring Oltrereno The first justification of the French Revolution is marked by its assimilation to a natural disaster (earthquake, hurricane, flood, etc.).. The moment of justification is clear: questioning the "legality" of the French Revolution-Wieland-state is like asking if it conforms to the law "in an earthquake or a hurricane in Jamaica Calabria" [1] . The conspiracy theory dear to the counterrevolutionary propaganda turns out to be devoid of meaning. Moreover, the comparison in question allows you to reject attacks on the French Revolution, the German courts without alarming too: there was no reason to worry in Germany in a plot that did not take place even in Paris, and the odd natural disaster that occurred beyond the Rhine was not disturbing the natural disasters in remote regions of the globe.
But if this theory could somehow reassure the courts, was not able to fool the ideologues smarter conservation: are the "defenders" of the revolution-state Gentz, the brilliant translator of Burke and future Metternich-adviser who consider it as an event "resulted from the nature of things and an indomitable necessity," flying over the question of its promoters [2] . The weakness of the assimilation of the revolution to a natural disaster was brought to light with clarity. Rehberg is expressed in similar terms, a senior official of Hanover. The answer to the latter provides that Fichte is not without embarrassment Rehberg "does not want revolutions are compared with the phenomena of nature. With your permission, as phenomena, that is not considered according to their moral principles, but their effects in the sensible world, revolutions are certainly only under the laws of nature " [3] . But it is the "moral principles" that they intended to discuss the theory of reaction! We are witnessing a paradox: to curtail the role of moral categories, to rely on the objectivity of the natural process are the defenders of the French Revolution, in Germany, mostly feed on the Kantian philosophy.
Do not believe that assimilation is a natural disaster of the revolution would only be in need of accommodation and care of before the power: instead plays an important role in the difficulty in conceptualizing the unprecedented events that were unfolding in France . In the eyes of journalism conservative and reactionary, the French Revolution in particular committing the crime of upsetting the laws of nature: you have to hand-Burke-states that it is absolutely respected the "method of nature," rather Gentz-presses its translation-the "divine nature of the method "exposing the" apostles of equality "that seek to overthrow the 'natural order of things" [4] . Well, if they rely on the theoretical nature of the reaction to consecrate the theory of gradualism, on the other side will respond to such a celebration, pointing out that even upheavals and natural disasters within the process. The German Jacobins
not exceeding this conceptual framework, even if they live in Mainz under the protection of the French army. "The volcano of France could save Germany by the earthquake" [5] : in these words is clearly evident to Forster's appeal to the German courts because they take the necessary reforms if they really want to avoid the upheavals of revolution. Is indirectly touched on the issue of liability of the dominant power in the scope of violent conflict. But this involved a further difficulty: the image of the natural disaster, the silent moment of subjectivity, if it carries out the progressive intellectuals before the dominant power of the charge of conspiracy, is not in a position to be accused, in a fully persuasive, the dominant power before the public. Kant calls the German courts not to leave heeded the "call of nature" resounding in the upheavals of Oltrereno [6] : Forster, reader and admirer of the great philosopher, celebrated in the French Revolution, "a work of justice of nature" [7] and behold the comparison natural, that carries out the conspiracy by the prosecution the promoters of the revolution, is charged with meaning to express a moral condemnation or to put pressure on the courts. It is not easy to connect the two aspects of one and the same comparison. The political revolutions
Wieland-state-are "effects of natural causes, and in most cases occur according to a law of nature so necessary that an expert and a fine observer of human affairs could predict with certainty when and where must check something like that. Just examine the conditions in France before 1789 to realize that the upheaval has occurred is nothing but the irresistible effect of preceding causes " [8] . It 's a theme developed more clearly by using the image of the flood Fichte: "When you prevent the progress of the human spirit" is very likely to occur an upheaval, as it happens "when the course of nature, which means delay, bursts and violently destroys everything that is on its way and then she takes the humanity of their oppressors in the most ruthless and revolutions become necessary." Hence the appeal to the German rulers to open the "dams" before it is too late [9] . As you can see, the moment of subjectivity is evoked, but only in reference to the responsibilities of the ruling class: the revolutionary movement is instead treated as a river that once stopped in its natural course, flooding the surrounding countryside with violence.
2. Objectivity and subjectivity in the revolutionary process
But why are not resolved all the problems. Drawn up to the limit of virtuosity, the comparison with a natural disaster could also be able to order the dominant power in Germany, performing French and German intellectuals of the charge of conspiracy, but never was able to establish a fully positive assessment of the Revolution French disaster was still a disaster. To emphasize the "multiple negative consequences" that are the inevitable result of any "political revolution," Wilhelm von Humboldt pointed out that the peaceful sprouting of the seed into the ground is more fruitful eruptions volcanic inevitably accompanied by grief and ruins [10] . Probably Humboldt Fichte answers when he observes that those natural disasters that are the political revolutions should not show only the element of destruction, there is a providential order that "the wreckage of the devastation rebuilds new worlds and the decay of the collapse raises new living bodies, which is flourishing vineyards flourish on the ruins of ancient volcanoes, which makes men dress, live and rejoice over the graves " [11] . Therefore, the revolution is a natural disaster at the same time makes it more fertile land that upsets, but always based on a dynamic purely objective.
It may, however, surprising hesitation in Fichte. Some years later, while continuing to affirm the liberating effect of the revolution when el'ineluttabilità "oppression has filled every measure, becoming unbearable, and the oppressed recover under the energy of despair" previously lost, the mission of ' man sees in natural disasters and denounces the "savage chaos of death and destruction" for more "floods, hurricanes and volcanoes erupting are the negation of the deepest needs of man's moral [12] . The comparison of the revolution a natural disaster is no longer able to express the good that is contained in the revolution. Meaningless to the ravages of natural disasters you may as well treat the incessant wars that they themselves doubt the moral order of the world and man's mission [13] . As late as 1798, Friedrich Schlegel, at that time fervent "Republican," he noted that, according to "the usual point of view," the French Revolution was to be considered "like an earthquake almost universal, a huge flood policy" [14 ] . But two years later, the text shows that the metaphor of Fichte naturalistic has now exhausted his / her role in gustificazione of the French Revolution and the revolutionary upheavals in general. There is indeed a reversal of its political significance: in 1820, during the revolution in Spain, will be the same Metternich to denounce the new flood or volcanic eruption, at a time when France and the surrounding villages were still covered by "lava of the first revolution" [15] .
It was not coincidence that ended in his capacity as a political conservative or reactionary sign of the assimilation of nature to the story. The validity of this assimilation has grave and justifiable doubts as early as 1795 Jean Paul. The latter, one way the comparison takes in several versions: as a "lightning arising from the proximity of the low and high tide and storms of the ether by unequal distribution of the air", so the marked inequality in the political cause unhappiness and storms; but, on the other hand, precisely because of the "terrible inequalities", "just a storm universal to all corners of the earth could result in a handsome building." Until then the storms are likely to continue. On the other hand, however, it is Jean Paul to warn them in explicit terms: "You should never approach too much to each other revolutions moral and fisische. The whole of nature is not different from those earlier movements, its trajectory is the circle [...]; only man is capable of change, in a straight line or zig-zag. " In conclusion, no man, no people, no age is raised, all in physics but must return " [16] .
accents and themes that I suggest to the Philosophy of History. Jean Paul is an author well-known to Hegel since the days of faith and know that, also, dealing in detail the mission of man, can already see abandoned by Fichte assimilation of the revolution to a natural disaster [17] .
3. Jacqueries, revolutions and production of the new
The comparison between natural disaster and political upheaval we find in Hegel, but with a totally different meaning. According to the Realphilosophie jenense are farmers who live in liabilities and always used to be taxes and all that emanates from established authority, when they rebel, have the effect of a 'flood' only able to destroy, or more to deposit a "mud generally fruitful for subsequent historical developments [18] . It del'inondazione dear can throw the first Fichte light on the nature of jacqueries, but not on the nature of a true political revolution.
The assimilation of historical events to natural disruptions in Hegel implies a negative connotation: it indicates attempts perhaps generous, but the tumultuous and ultimately hardly convincing. So says the lessons on the history of philosophy on the subject of Renaissance philosophers: "These remarkable apparitions reminiscent of the dissolution, the earthquake and the eruption of a volcano, which had formed inside and gave birth to new creations, but still wild and irregular. " A Cardano, Bruno, Vanini, Campanella must be recognized "subjective power of the spirit" and yet Their "rebellion" against "the existence of fact" is characterized by "confusion" and "intimate inconsistency." Only a revolt that fails to actually produce the new can be assimilated to a natural disaster, although these philosophers are mostly post-Reformation, they "belong to the Middle Ages." By contrast, the Reformation, which is the first real break of the Middle Ages is a "great revolution", and for this reason is not compared to a simple natural upheaval [19] .
For there to be revolution-as if to explain the phenomenology of the opening chapter on the absolute freedom and the Terror-you need a "real disruption of reality." The phrase may seem redundant but serves to underscore the absolute necessity of the new. From this result, the assimilation of the revolution to a natural disaster does not make sense: in the natural world is not really the new production, given that the change is basically cyclical, and therefore appears as a repetition of the identical [20] . Lectures on the Philosophy of History, in celebrating the French Revolution, opposed the permanent stability of the natural world to the enormous novelty of this historic event: "From the sun is shining in the firmament and the planets revolve around it, had not yet seen [...]" [21] . The political revolution is thus not just a violent convulsion. To understand it adequate, you must keep in mind also the moment of subjectivity. And this time Hegel vigorously insists: "The great revolutions that leap to the eyes are necessarily preceded by a silent revolution, secret, in the spirit of" [22] , according to the Encyclopaedia (§ 246 Z), "in world and the revolutions in science stem from the fact that the spirit has changed its categories "yes," the French Revolution had its genesis and its beginning in thought ", in the" philosophy " [23] .
4. Gradually and qualitative leap
We are not in the presence of an idealistic assessment, the new formulation involves the Hegelian vision of historical process as a whole. The category of gradualism dominates Kant's conception of progress: the freedom "phased" (allmählich), even if it is interrupted by intervals of folly or obscurantism; enlightenment "occurs gradually (allmählich), the war itself is gradually (allmählich) felt to be intolerable. In conclusion, the history advancing at a slow pace, but infallible to progress: the Enlightenment "have to, little by little (muss nach und nach), to rise up to their thrones and influence on the government's own guidelines" [24] .
In support of this centrality of the category of gradualism is a "metaphysical law of continuity" (lex continuitatis Metaphysica), which Kant formulates: "All the changes (mutationes) are constant or fluid, and that opposite states follow each other only through a series of intermediate states other than " [25] . Not even the outbreak of the French Revolution substantially change this view of history and change. What happened in France demonstrates the tendency of mankind to progress, which also continues to be conceived in evolutionary terms. The progress does not ensure "an ever-increasing quality of morality," but still quantitative extension of the "legality". And so, "gradually (allmählich) will decrease the use of the powerful to the violence and increase respect for the laws, there will be a bit 'more charitable [...]" [26] .
The evolutionary scheme falls into crisis with Fichte therefore first tries to assimilate in terms theoretical and the great experience the French Revolution: the historical development proceeds, "or jump or violent und gradual progress, slow, safe (oder durch entweder durch gewaltsame Sprünge allmähliches, langsames, aber sicheres Fortschreiten). Albeit at the cost of sacrifices, so temporary, but severe and painful, "a violent shock, shaking and with great political turmoil (durch Sprung, und durch gewaltsame Staatserschütterungen Umwälzungen) a people can advance in more than half a century would not in ten centuries. " Yet, alongside this vision that theoretically reflects the huge upheavals that occurred in France, continues to survive illuminisitico scheme of "progressively toward an increasing progress of the Enlightenment (allmähliches Fortschreiten größeren zur Aufklärung) and thus towards the improvement of the political constitution." As an illustration of this scheme is adopted the example of Germany: "It is true that the Gothic features of the building are still visible almost everywhere, and new buildings are still far from completion with that compose an organic whole well, but at least there are, and begin to be inhabited, and ancient castles to them robbers fall into disrepair. These, if not disturbed our work, will be more (immermehr) abandoned by the men and left as home to owls and bats that abhor the light grew and new buildings will eventually be composed gradually (allmählich) into a whole more regular " [27] . It is not so important that Fichte declares his preference for the gradual evolution (it obviously applies even more to Hegel), in this context I'm especially interested in analyzing the overall vision of history. For Fichte the upheavals occur "when the course of nature, which means delay, bursts and violently destroys everything that is on its way."
E 'particularly significant picture of the River: the flow slow and quiet of its water, constitutes the ordinary course of things, the historical development, it is just an attempt to obstruct and block, causing the flooding. Not for the plot and the development of objective contradictions you experience the upheavals of revolution, but for the intervention of the artificial (the blindness and the desire for domination of the despots) that seeks in vain to oppose this gradual spread of enlightenment that is nature, the latter felt then his relentless revenge. The evolutionary pattern has worn out and came on the crisis, as evidenced by the emergence of a new category of "jumping", and yet the historical experience of the Revolution French has not yet acquired a new comprehensive view of historical development.
This only occurs in Hegel in his Logic, of course, that of the middle class is a qualitative leap. The break of gradualism has not only characterized the French Revolution. Inspired by the Reformation, Lectures on the history of philosophy say: "It seems as if the spirit in these times, which until then had proceeded to a snail's pace in its development, had also downgraded es'era away from him, putting on boots seven leagues. " In other cases the image of the snail is replaced by the mole (the latter image, as know, dear to Marx). but we see the text of Hegel. After working as a mole, the spirit is finally able to shake "the earth's crust that separated it from its sun, its concept." And so, "during which the crust, and rotten soulless building, collapsed, and the spirit takes on the appearance of a new youth, it fits the seven-league boots" [28] . The historical change has now suffered a sudden acceleration, the slow workings of the mole, which slowly eroded the foundations of the existing order, formed the basis of radical upheaval. It is significant that the theme of the mole returns to Hegel, manuscript in memo prepared for the last lesson in philosophy of law, to explain the outbreak of the Revolution of July after the long years of apparent inaction of the Restoration [29] .
Even when Hegel speaks of "slow" (Langsamkeit) or "patience" (Geduld) of the universal spirit, never degenerates into a conception of evolution: they are metaphors that do not indicate the character painless but, on the contrary, complex and contradictory the historical process, his transcendence in respect to the wishes and expectations of the individual, its unpredictable twists. The journey of the spirit (Weg) is mediation, is the longest route (Umwege). The story proceeds not in a straight line but zig-zag through the contradictions and struggles that develop unceasingly: "It 'a process (Fortgang) not in the empty time, but infinitely filled and full of struggle, not a simple process in the abstract concepts of pure thought, but advancing to this level only because all his moves in real life. " It 's a point on which Hegel insists vigorously: the' spiritual evolution "is not" a simple movement with no resistance in the medium of space and time, but work, work against the existing data (gegen ein Vorhandenes) and its transformation ". The "slow" (Langsamkeit) is therefore not a metaphor for the gradual painless but dramatic complexity of historical process, it is enhanced "by the apparent setbacks" (Rückschritte), the "times of barbarism." To give an idea "of the slowness of the enormous expense and work of the Spirit", Hegel gives the example of freedom. And 'now a matter of fact gathering that freedom lies man as such, but this result assumes the "colossal upheavals" (ungeheuerste Umwälzungen), not only is a historic achievement, but rather a result of recent and that to succeed he had to go through enormous struggles and a tortuous and contradictory process [30] .
5. Revolution and contradiction
objective is not the only category of the qualitative leap to refer to the historical experience of the revolution. More importantly is the category of contradiction. The French Revolution was particularly instructive: the victory achieved sull'assolutismo monarchy and the feudal reaction had not meant the achievement of stability, but the development of new and more dramatic struggles, at each stage of the revolutionary process had arisen new divisions in the party that had also defeated a whole - at least so it seemed-his enemies. It was a fact that lent itself to interpretations and moralistic considerations such as: "The revolution devours its children, like Saturn." These are the words that later put into the mouth of Büchner Danton on which already projects the threatening shadow of the death sentence about to inflict on his former comrades in arms, but is largely why the applicant in counterrevolutionary propaganda, and in fact in exactly the same terms, expresses Gentz, an adviser of Metternich, in a letter to Adam Muller, one of the ideologues of the Restoration [31] . But on the other side, is always in the text of moralism affected Büchner's Robespierre's explanation that provides continuous struggle and constantly renewing itself in revolutionary struggles such are caused by traitors or followers of despotism disguised [32] . Here's what he writes but the Phenomenology: An
party proves a winner just because it splits into two parties, and thus shows himself to have in the principle that first fight, and that he then removed (aufgehoben) the one-sidedness in which the first stood. The interest was divided between him and the other, he falls completely in hours, and forget the other party, since he himself in his [ie the party winning] is the antithesis (Gegensatz) that keeps him busy. But at the same time it [the antithesis] has been built in higher victorious element, where has purified. So therefore the split (Zwietracht) source in one of the parties, although it seems a misfortune, merely indicates his fortune [33] .
Despite the persistent ambiguity of the category dell'Aufhebung, that peeps out here, the point is clear, however, the vision of history as a continuous development of contradictions. The category of contradiction is made to intervene to explain the outbreak of the revolution. It is above all to take this "all this contradiction (Widerspruch) that dominated our lives" and that he had discredited and made obnoxious the institutions before the mass of the people. Hegel describes with great effectiveness the relentless dialectic that objective becomes inevitable violent confrontation. Implicitly rejecting the theory of a plot, Hegel observes that the Enlightenment and the intellectual opposition "not to think about a revolution, they merely want and demand better, or better than they seem likely [...]. Those philosophers who could not get a general idea of \u200b\u200bwhat needed to be done, they could not trace the way to do it. The government would have been for new institutions to promote and ensure real improvements, but it did not knew how to make " [34] .
Hegel also questioned why the lack of reform and identify the cause in the objective contradictions crossing the same ruling class. In the analysis of concrete lessons on the history of philosophy, the Hegelian dialectic is not, as Althusser would say, the antithesis of the contradiction surdeterminée. In France, the reform was not "undertaken by the government, because the court, clergy, nobility, parliament did not want to give up their privileges or under compulsion or in the name of the right to exist in and of itself." Radical changes were needed, but were blocked by the resistance and contradictions of the ruling class: it is at this point that the "change" becomes "necessarily violent" [35] . Now let's review
Logic: The abstract
identity itself is still viable, but because the positive is in itself the negativity, so it comes out of his mind and enter the change. Something just is therefore vital in that it contains within itself the contradiction and it is this strength, to understand and support the self-contradiction. However, when an existing can not extend its positive determination to embrace self-determination at the same time, the negative and take firm into one another, ie can not have in himself the contradiction, then it is not living unit itself, is not the foundation or principle, but failed in contradiction [36] .
When a social-political order can not control and channel the irrepressible drive for change, when it fails to master the negativity that inevitably circulates in its own facilities, then it is doomed to be swept away. Against "the hypocrisy, the bigots, the tyranny," crying shame on the subversive contained in the Enlightenment, Hegel notes that it is necessary to "render justice" even the "dark side", otherwise not understand anything about the real situation historical [37] . But it has a meaning not unlike the observation contained in logic, to a higher level of generality, that task of thought is primarily to take advantage of the existing contradictions actually [38] . Hegel thus identifies the genesis of the revolution in a complex, in a tangle of contradictions, and the decisive importance of logic in having provided the conceptual tools necessary for understanding of that fact: the violent upheavals that sweep away the old feudal world, and, more generally an order now decrepit and intolerable, are not the result of a conspiracy and devious maneuvers, as suggested by the theorists of the counter, but they are not the result of the rebellion, indignation a sort of moral conscience considered contrary to the natural rights of man, or they tended to do as they did not just theoretical, but the protagonists of the French Revolution. But
major category is mainly negative. Hegel celebrates the 'immense power of the negative " [39] and negativity is a central category of logic, whose genesis, or whose centrality can not be adequately understood unless one keeps in mind the experience behind the Revolution French, the historical moment the highest and most dramatic of negativity. Hegel describes the terror precisely as the triumph of the "negativity" that "penetrated" every moment of the object, the existing social order and political [40] , his tragedy is the inability to build a new positive. The fact remains that the category of negativity is modeled on the basis of historical experience of the French Revolution and the Jacobin Terror. From that moment on, every view of history that ignores "the seriousness, the pain, the patience and the work of the negative" in the building and even nell'insipienza expires "," not the life that horrified face of death, dodge of destruction, rather than bearing the death and it is maintained, is the life of the spirit. It gains its truth only if it find itself in the absolute tear (Zerrissenheit) " [41] .
But more important is the fact that, for Hegel, negativity is not only an activity of the subject, but is inherent in the first place in the same objectivity. If the negative inequality appears to be ego to the object, it is also the inequality of the substance from it. What seems to arise out of her, and be an asset against her, it is your work, and it shows that they are essentially subjective " [42] . So the same political and social transformations are not the result of a project purely subjective: the "change" (Veränderung) Propaedeutics-state-is posed by inequality itself with itself, ie the objects in the real contradictions, it is therefore "the denial of the negative that something (Etwas) has in itself" [43] . But once again it is clear that the logical formula has come from actual historical experience. Speaking of the 'address negative "taken in France from the Enlightenment, Hegel writes that he simply" destroy what had already destroyed himself, " that "[...] the old institutions no longer corresponded to the spirit that had given rise to" [44] . The old feudal society and its ideology were now ossified into a positive, a positive that was the "negative right", and that it was heard and was really intolerable violence. "The oppression led to the investigation", the outlet revolution was inevitable: "The thought has become violence where it was faced with the positive as violence [45]
The process of radicalization of the Revolution and the collapse of first constitution based on constitutional monarchy is explained by considering the objective dialectic: "This constitution was immediately a contradiction (Widerspruch) intrinsic [...]. You should then take the collision (Kollision) of the subjective will, and later manifested opposition (Gegensatz) of conviction " [46] . It 's true, in the Great logic, the category of "contradiction" is followed by that of the "foundation". But, in this regard, the Encyclopedia makes it clear: "The foundation, which at first there was found to be the overcoming of the contradiction, it emerges as a new contradiction" (Z § 121).
Hegel is able to maintain this clear vision of historical events before they leave, at least initially, suspicious if not hostile. The Revolution of July is explained by the emergence of a new "division" that splits the forces that had made the compromise of 1814-15, which resulted in the compromise granted by the ruler of a constitution octroyée. Among those forces were already deep contradictions: "In fact, although the Charte the sign of all, and despite having sworn both sides, however, by one side or the conviction was a Catholic, and one was a duty of conscience to subvert existing institutions " [47] . The contradiction first latent explodes, again the one divides into two, and there is a new revolutionary upheaval, a new qualitative leap.
Hegel that we have seen, in emphasizing the moment of subjectivity in the revolutionary process, reject the image of the natural disaster, now, to emphasize the weight of the objective contradictions, used in turn to a significant picture: when there is the matter of made the "maturity of the revolution" (Reife zur Revolution), the outbreak of the revolution appears as an 'accidental', but it really is like "a spark that falls on the gunpowder" [48] , and ie on a material arsonist, a tangle of contradictions ready to explode.
is expressed in similar terms later in the Philosophy of Law: "A spark thrown on a pile of gunpowder is a danger of very different when it falls on a hard ground where it is lost without a trace" (§ 319 A).
It is seen that the Reformation in the eyes of Hegel is a "great revolution." Well how to explain this event? It would be absurd to reduce it to the initiative of "an individual, as here, eg., Luther: the great individuals are products of the same time." To explain the revolutionary event is not even enough for an accident, you traits as well the traffic of indulgences. In fact, "from the perspective of the overall opportunity is indifferent when it is necessary in and of itself, and the spirit itself is ready, it can manifest itself both in a way that another" [49] . Let's read in the Logic: "When you have fully all the conditions of one thing, what goes into reality." But the possibility of a thing is not, as tradition, its conceivability logic, its internal non-contradiction, but a variety of conditions, "where the contradiction is so easily discovered, only that it is not" a compare the contradiction, but a contradiction objective [50] . The transition from possibility to reality, and once again Hegel thinks of the French Revolution and the great historical upheavals, is mediated by the accumulation of contradictions in a kind of powder keg, which may appear accidental explosion only to the superficial glance.
6. Revolution and disease
But to better understand how the categories of logic concettualizzino the historical experience of the French Revolution, it is good to start from another image in vogue in Germany to describe the upheavals that were occurring Oltrereno. This image of the disease dating back to Rousseau (The Social Contract, II, 8) and that, as regards Germany, we find in Einsiedel, in what was Jacobin Görres (who even speaks of "pox"), especially in the Jacobin Forster: "The State which is shaken by revolutions resembles a feverish illness: a strong life force leads the struggle against the foreign element that it must expel or to which shall perish: health crisis and furious succeed one another, until the nature stronger has the decided upper hand or the body becomes disrupted the prey of death and decay " [51] . While justifying the
French Revolution, this view was likely to bring up the negativity as coming from without, as a "foreign" element. It is no coincidence, as that of the natural disaster, even the metaphor of disease, suitably modified and with a firm emphasis on his character that are alien to the body, then finds significant spread between the reactionary journalism: the "disease politics" and " contagious illness of the people "about the late Friedrich Schlegel during his Vienna lectures of philosophy of history and, summarily, of" fever "or" cancer "is about Metternich himself [52] .
However, Always respect the revolutionary circles, the metaphor of the disease is also found in Einsiedel, "Things had a similar policy to the physical ones. For a time you can stop the course of nature means that disturb and slow it down though in the end, if you are not able to eliminate the causes of evil, the disease explodes. The same occurs in religious and political revolutions [...]" [53] . Forster was at least an author well-known to Hegel [54] . You can now better understand the logic of the argument against that conception which considers the contradiction, "is in reality, in thinking reflection as accidental, almost an anomaly and a transient paroxysm morbid. " For Hegel, contradiction, far from being "an anomaly that the showing here and there" is, instead, "the negative of its essential determination, the principle of every move, move that does not consist only in an explicit and show Contradiction " [55] .
7. Revolution, Enlightenment, French and German classical philosophy
E 'Hegel himself to highlight the link between logic and its reflection on the French Revolution: The Preface to the first edition, which was dated 1812, writes: "The spirit Again, that is not built for science except for the fact, the logic has not been done yet to hear. " It involves building a logical height of the "general change" (allgemeine Veränderung) of the "complete transformation (gänzliche Veränderung) which was produced" by about twenty-five years " [56] . It 's the same date which the philosopher makes use of Heidelberg, to indicate "that began twenty-five years ago in a neighboring kingdom, and that then caused a major impact in all the spirits", to indicate that the French Revolution, that 'decisive event which marks the starting point of "these last twenty-five years" between the richest and most instructive of universal history [57] . Logic intends to constitute the theoretical system of the principles of the French Revolution, net of their means "abstract" Jacobin, and having gained in maturity in the post-Thermidor.
As you know, the young Marx emphasizes the fact "puzzling" that a people "down" the "political community" (politisches Gemeinwesen) to "mere means for preserving these so-called human rights', in Just when mass political appeals to the enthusiasm for the defense of the new revolutionary institutions: the "revolutionary practice is in flagrant contradiction with his theory of" [58] .
pad Marx has an even more general. Consider the concept of history. We have seen the limits that still exist in the evolutionary thinking of the same German revolutionaries. It remains to be seen whether these limits have been exceeded on the other side of the Rhine Here we simply mention the Gironde Condorcet, author of a draft of a philosophy of history immediately translated and celebrated in Germany. Condorcet, who wrote his Esquisse rage while the revolutionary upheavals, were nevertheless not able to substantially exceed a piecemeal view of development. "Progress" Town is "subject to the same general laws that are observed in the individual development of our faculties, for it is the result of this development, since at the same time a large number of people gathered in society." But once treated independent evolution, the story is presented as a continuum with no contradictions and smoothly: "The result shows that any time depends on what that offered moments earlier, and affects one of the times that should follow." Given that progress depends fundamentally on the diffusion of light, it can objectively be delayed or hindered by ignorance and prejudice, may be forced to deal with fights, yet never loses its performance never quite fundamentally straight. The resistance of obscurantism can make it inevitable "tremendous and rapid movements," but the rule is "the effects of the progress is slow but infallible" [59] . Writing in 1793, Condorcet obviously could not help but refer to the revolution, but this is interpreted as the simple elimination of a barrier which claims to artificially restrain the natural course of things. Hegel, who works in a time when the category of gradualism has become the watchword of the reactionary journalism, is forced to a showdown with the conception of evolutionary history. Encyclopedia (Z § 258) we find this astonishing statement: "The gradual surface is the last refuge for peace and to give life to things." The fact that the Hegelian logic in its categories conceptualizes the historical experience of the Great Revolution, is celebrated by Herzen as the algebra of revolution [60] It is also and read with passion and participation by Lenin. In Germany, after the failure of the revolution of '48, even the most faithful of the Hegelian school take to criticize the logic of the master. It has made the mistake of giving undue weight to the category of contradiction; but this contradiction-in short, the objection is the guillotine -Rosenkranz [61] . Founded as a conceptualization of the French Revolution, Hegel's Logic in Germany falls into crisis when he falls into crisis the very image of the French Revolution vanishes, and both become the subject of general condemnation on the grounds that appear to preclude or raise the specter of a ' other revolution, the social one.
[1] CM Wieland, Sendschreiben an Herrn Professor Eggers in Kiel (1792), in Wieland's Werke, Berlin sd, vol. XXXIV, pp. 150-1.
[2] F. von Gentz, Versuch einer Apologie des Herrn der Widerlegung Makintosh, 1793, in Selected Writings, a cura di W. Weick, Stuttgart and Leipzig 1836-38, vol. II, pp. 128-9.
[3] JG Fichte, recovery of a freedom of thought by the princes of Europe, which they previously suppressed (1793), in Fichte's works, a cura di IH Fichte (ristampa anastatica, Berlin 1971), vol. VI, p. 27, n. (tr. it. In JG Fichte, La rivoluzione francese, a cura di VE Alfieri, II ed Roma-Bari 1974, p. 7).
[4] E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, (1790), in The Works of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. A New Edition, London 1826, vol. V, p. 79 e p. 104; la traduzione è stata Tues Gentz \u200b\u200bNuovamente pubblicata a cura di L. Iser con introduzione Tues D. Henrich, Frankfurt a. M., 1967, p. 70.
[5] Lettera a Ch F. Voss (21/12/1792), in G. Forster, works in four volumes, a cura di G. Steiner, Frankfurt a. M., 1969, vol. IV, p. 809.
[6] I. Kant, Perpetual Peace, in The Collected Writings (ed. dell'Accademia delle Scienze), vol. VIII, p. 373, n.
[7] G. Forster, History of English Literature from 1790 (1791), in units in four volumes, cit., Vol. III, p. 326.
[8] M. Wieland, missive, cit., P. 150.
[9] JG Fichte, call back, cit., P. 6 (tr. it. Cit., P. 7).
[10] W. von Humboldt, ideas in an attempt to determine the limits of the effectiveness of the state, in Collected Works, Berlin, 1903-36 (ed. dell'Accademia delle Scienze), vol. I, p. 101.
[11] JG Fichte, call back, cit., P. 27 (tr. it cit, p. 30..); Le Considerazioni Tues Humboldt sul tema rivoluzione-vulcanica Eruzione, spruce potrebbe averle lettering sulla "Berlin Monatsschrift" (ottobre 1792), la rivista a cui lo stesso e collaboravano Kant spruce ( maggio 1793); cf. U. Schulz, the Berlin Monatsschrift (1783-1796). A biography, Hildesheim 1969th
[12] JG Fichte, The Destiny of Man, 1800, in Fichte's works, cit., vol. II, pp. 273 E 267th
[13] Ivi, p. 269.
[14] "Athenaeum" I, 1, p. 309-10.
[15] H. von Treitschke in Riportato, German history in the nineteenth century, Leipzig 1879-1894, vol. III, pp. 153-4.
[16] J. Paul, Hesperus, in Complete Works, a cura di E. Berend, Weimar 1929, vol. III, pp. 384-6 passim.
[17] GWF Hegel, Jenaer writings, works in twenty volumes, a cura di E. Moldenhauer and KM Michel e, Frankfurt a. M. 1969-79, vol. II, pp. E 421-3 372.
[18] GWF Hegel, Jenaer real philosophy, a cura di J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg, 1969, p. 255.
[19] GWF Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, in Werke, cit., Vol. XX, pp. 18, 61 and 49 (tr. it. Codignola by E. and G. Sanna, Florence 1967, vol. II, 1, pp. 208-9, 238 and 247).
[20] GWF Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, edited by G. Lasson, Hamburg 1968, pp. 133-4 (tr. it. Edited by G. Calogero, Florence 1963, vol. I, pp. 154-6). Another significant change is possible to see in Hegel than the previous tradition. Forster uses the natural comparison, as well as revolutions, even for the war, similar to "storms purify and freshen the air policy "(Ansichten vom Niederrhein, von Brabant, Flandern, Holland, England und Frankreich im April, Mai und Junius 1790, in Werke in vier Banden, cit., vol. II, p. 524). Something similar can be seen already in Herder: Ideas for the philosophy of human history compares revolutions and wars to the "waves" and "storm" that prevent rivers and seas to turn into dead swamp (in Sämtliche Werke, in edited by B. Suphan, Berlin 1877-1913, reprint Hildesheim 1967-8, vol. XIII, p. 353 and vol. XIV, pp. 220-1). Dropping for the revolution, Hegel takes up the comparison only for the wars compared to the "winds that protect against rot seas and lakes "(Ueber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, in Werke, cit., vol. II, p. 482, we find the same metaphor in Jenaer Realphilosophie, cit., p. 261, N. and Rechtsphilosophie , § 324). But in this case the comparison can be understood from the fact that States, as regards their mutual relations, are still in their natural state, in which the conflicts and wars are a recurring phenomenon, a sort of natural compound in history. However, this does not mean that, in the explanation of each conflict we should build, not alleged laws of nature, but by the "contradictions" and "collisions" che volta in volta si Tues verificano (cf. the German constitution, in plants, cit., vol. I, p. 54), cioè da source categorie che, come vedremo meglio in seguito, il processo Hegel usa per spiegare storico in generale , e lo Scoppio delle rivoluzioni in particolare.
[21] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, cit., P. 926 (tr. it. Cit., Lievemente modificata, vol. IV, p. 205).
[22] GWF Hegel, The positivity of the Christian religion, in works, cit., Vol. I, p. 203.
[23] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, cit., Pp. 920 E 924 (tr. it. Vol. IV, pp. 197 e 203).
[24] I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, eighth sentence.
[25] I. Kant, De mundi sensibilis atque forma et principiis intelligible, § 14
[26] I. Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties, in Collected Works, cit., Vol. VII, p. 92.
[27] JG Spruce, Back claims cit., Pp. 5-6 (tr. it.. Cit. 6-7).
[28] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the history of philosophy. Cit. 62 e 456 (tr. it. Cit., Modificata, vol. III, 2, 2 e p. 411-2).
[29] GWF Hegel, Philosophy of Law, sgg a cura di KH Ilting, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1973rd, vol. IV, p. 915.
[30] GWF Hegel, Berliner transcript (iniziata il 10/24/1820) dell'Einleitung all lectures on the history of philosophy, works, cit., Vol. XX, pp. 507-9.
[31] Danton's Death: Act I, a room, a lettera di F. Gentz \u200b\u200bA. Müller (12/17/1828), in Adam Müller's life testimonies, a cura di J. Baxa, Munich-Paderborn-Vienna 1966 , vol. II, p. 954.
[32] Danton's Death: soprattutto Act I, the Jacobin club. Ma è la spiegazione effettivamente fornita da Robespierre stesso nella realtà: ad esempio il rapporto alla cfr Convenzione del 12/25/1793.
[33] GWF Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, in Works, cit., Vol. III, p. 425 (tr. it a cura di E. De Negri, Firenze 1963, vol II, p. 117;.. Si siamo in più punti dalla traduzione italiana che ci discostati SEMBRA, per tale brano, fuorviante).
[34] GWF Hegel cit, lectures on the history of philosophy that works., Vol. XX, pp. 295-7 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. III, 2, pp. 247-9).
[35] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, cit., Pp. 925-6 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. IV, p. 204).
[36] GWF Hegel, Science of logic, in works cit., vol. VI, p. 76 (tr. it. Di A. Moni, riv. Da C. Cesa, Roma-Bari 1978, vol. II, pp. 72-3).
[37] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in Works, cit., Vol. XX, pp. 295-6 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. III, 2, pp. 247-8).
[38] GWF Hegel, Science of Logic, in plants, cit., Vol. VI, p. 78 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. II, p. 74).
[39] GWF Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, cit., P. 36 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. I, p. 26)
[40] Ivi, p. 433 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. II, p. 126).
[41] Ivi, pp. 24 e 36 (tr. it. Cit., Lievemente modificata, vol. I, pp. 14 e 26).
[42] Ivi, p. 39 (tr. it cit.., Vol. I, p. 29).
[43] GWF Hegel, the philosophical texts propaedeutics in plants, cit., Vol. IV, p. 14.
[44] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, in Works, cit., Vol. XX, pp. 295-6 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. III, 2, pp. 247-8).
[45] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, cit., P. 925 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. IV, pp. 203-4).
[46] Ivi, p. 929 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. IV, pp. 208-9).
[47] Ivi, p. 932 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. IV, p. 218).
[48] GWF Hegel, the philosophical texts propaedeutics cit., P. 99
[49] GWF Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, cit., P. 877 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. IV, p. 147).
[50] GWF Hegel, Science of Logic, cit., In Works, cit., Vol. VI, pp. 209-10 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. II, pp. 222-3).
[51] G. Forster, presentation of the Revolution in Mainz, 1793, in works in four volumes, cit., Vol. III, pp. 658-9, per quanto riguarda Görres cfr. The leaves and the revolutionary fever, a medical-political parallels, in "The Red Leaf" (1798), ora in Collected Works, a cura di W. Schell mountain, Cologne 1928, vol. I, p. 164.
[52] Cfr. H. Treitschke, op cit., Vol. III, p. 153.
[53] In The German Republic from 1775 to 1795. Texts of radical Democrats, a cura di J. Hermand, Frankfurt a. M., 1975, p. 343.
[54] Per quanto riguarda Forster cfr documents to Hegel's Development, a cura di J. Hoffmeister, Stuttgart 1936, pp. 217 ss.
[55] GWF Hegel, Science of Logic, in plants, cit., Vol. VI, pp. 75-6 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. II, p. 71
[56] Ivi, vol. V, pp. 15 e 13 (tr. it. Cit., Vol. I, pp. 7 e 5).
[57] GWF Hegel , assessment of Verhandlungen in der Versammlung der Landstände of Königreich Württemberg im Jahr 1815 und 1816, in Werke, cit., Vol. IV, p. 507.
[58] K. Marx, Zur Judenfrage, in K. Marx-F. Engels, Werke, Berlin 1955 sec., Vol. I, pp. 366-7.
[59] Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the progress of the human mind, in Oeuvres, A. da pubblicate E Condorcet O'Connor MF Arago, Paris 1847 (ristampa Anastatica Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1968) vol. IV, pp. 12, 22-3 e 239.
[60] A. Herzen, philosophical texts chosen, Mosca, 1950, p. 579.
[61] Nel sottolineare gli elementi e negativi the contraddizioni of bourgeois society, Proudhon "knows the only form of dialectic ghiglottina": cf. K. Rosenkranz, Selbständigkeit Die deutschen Philosophie der gegenüber der französischen (1852), in Neue Studien, Leipzig 1875-8, vol. II, p. 226; Rosenkranz critical but Hegel himself for the 'excessive' role he attributed to the category of contradiction. See K. Rosenkranz, Wissenschaft der logischen Ideas, Königsberg 1858-9, vol. II, p. 253 and passim; the failure of the revolution of 1848 as a condition of crisis of Hegelian philosophy in Germany refer to our work between Hegel and Bismarck. The revolution of 1848 and the crisis of German culture, Rome 1983.
I had a simple question and sensible, but I think it was a little 'late' (excuse the brutality, read it in the sense sweet) I thought it was a stupid question and I laughed. Arguably, however, he must have thought that I was an idiot 
. Wow, you did not see Michael go? Who do you think is driving the shuttle? 
